In the United States, water allocation law remains, for the most part, state law. The three models of private property law-common property, private property, and public property-each corresponds to one of the three real-world forms of water law found in the several United States today.o Work on the theory of private property suggests that the correspondence of the forms of water law to the theoretical models allows us to predict with some certainty whether existing forms are adaptable to changing circumstances, or whether an entirely new form must be substituted when water demand or supply change dramatically.
To the east of Kansas City, water was readily available to people at little or no cost. 32 Although there might be serious problems with water quality, shortages, historically, were rare and short-lived. 33 There evolved in this setting a body of law known as riparian rights, predicated on treating the resource as common property. 34 To the west of Kansas City, water often was scarce, or at least misplaced.
3 ' There, the right to use water was treated as private property under the law of appropriative rights. Finally, in the second half of the twentieth century, water users in the eastern United States began to experience recurring and intensifying shortages. 37 A bit more than half of the states that had been applying riparian rights responded by developing a third model known as regulated riparianism, which treats . An ambitious study of the evolution of the common law of water from 1066 to the present posited that there are two forms of property in water, one based on the ownership of land (riparian rights), and the other on the protection of uses (appropriative rights). Anthony Scott & Georgina Coustalin, The Evolution of Water Rights, 35 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 821 (1995) . This analysis overlooks the possibility of the public management that is emerging in regulated riparian states. See Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 17. 30. This correspondence was virtually recognized in Keys v. Romley (discussing the three forms of law governing the drainage of diffused surface water, identifying one as a "property regime," one as a "tort regime," and not categorizing the third). Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1966 
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water as public property. 8 I have written extensively on each type of property in water and water usage elsewhere. In this paper, I will only examine how the Great Lakes states have sought to use water allocation law as a device for impeding or precluding the export of waters from the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Watershed. I will also examine a different kind of proprietary interest that arises under the rubric of the public trust doctrine and how it might be used in attempts to preclude the export of water from the Lakes.
III. TRADITIONAL RIPARIAN RIGHTS AS LIMITING THE EXPORT OF WATER
Having written elsewhere about the law of riparian rights, 40 I do not present a full analysis here. Instead, I explore those aspects of riparian rights that are relevant to the export of water from the watershed of origin. Three features of traditional riparian rights would preclude the export of water from a watershed: the natural flow theory, the limitation of water use to riparian land, and the watershed rule. The natural flow theory effectively disappeared in the late nineteenth century, if it ever actually applied to water users, while the riparian land requirement and the watershed rule both were seriously eroded in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. As a result, even without considering the possibility that a state might choose to override riparian rights to authorize exports by statute, the common law of riparian rights is no longer an effective barrier to the export of water from the Great Lakes Watershed.
A. The Natural Flow Theory
The earliest cases announcing the theory of riparian rights often stated that riparian landowners have the right to have water flow across, or lie upon, their land in its natural condition, without alteration by others of the rate of flow, the quantity, or the quality of the water. 4 42 If that were truly the law of riparian rights, it would effectively preclude any export of water from the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Watershed because such an export would necessarily alter the natural flow. Thus, in theory, any person owning riparian land within the watershed could sue to enjoin a withdrawal of water out of the watershed without proof of injury. 43 Such a restrictive reading was probably never in fact the law under riparian rights," except when the natural flow theory was occasionally invoked to compel a public entity, such as a municipality, to pay just compensation for displacing existing riparian uses.
4 5 Even if the natural flow theory was once the correct understanding of riparian rights, courts invariably have abandoned it whenever it threatened to prevent the development and use of the water resources of a state.
46

B. Use on Non-Riparian Land
While western states abandoned riparian rights in favor of appropriative rights, 4 7 eastern states (including the states sharing the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Watershed) all adopted the reasonable use rule for riparian rights. 48 The reasonable use theory made the outcome of litigation between competing water users both unpredictable and unstable because courts used a balancing test to allocate water to the use that best served society's interests. 49 
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15 applied, would preclude the export of water from a watershed, including the Great Lakes Watershed, because the right to use water is limited to uses on riparian land-land that is contiguous to the source of the water.so
If a tract of land on which water is to be used is separated from the water source, no matter how narrow the intervening land, that tract of land is non-riparian." Unlike the balancing approach to disputes between competing riparian landowners, a riparian landowner has the right to enjoin a non-riparian's use because non-riparians' uses are inherently unreasonable, and, therefore, are not to be balanced against riparian uses.s 2 A minor twist in this context would arise depending on whether the state in which the tract was located followed the "unity of title" test or the "source of title" test in defining riparian tracts. 53 Under the "source of title" test, subdivision of a tract of land terminates the riparian status of any part no longer adjacent to the water source, and the affected parts do not recover their riparian status even if reunited with riparian land under a single ownership. 54 This can only be determined through a title search. 
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[Vol. 24:1 PROTECT THE GREAT LAKES "unity of title" test, an entire tract of land under single ownership is considered riparian if any part of the tract is riparian, regardless of ownership history." Strict application of the rule on non-riparian uses by itself would effectively preclude all but de minimus exports from the watershed, regardless of which approach was used to define riparian land, for few, if any, tracts of land would extend very far beyond the boundaries of the watershed. Growing demand for water put pressure on the rule limiting uses to riparian lands. The desire to evade the limitation of uses to riparian lands was prominent in the first case to announce the Colorado rule of pure appropriative rights (without any vestige of riparian rights). 6 As demand for water grew in states that continued to adhere to riparian rights, critics began to identify this feature-of riparian rights as one of its major defects: there is, after all, no reason to think that the most socially or economically desirable uses of water would be on riparian land.
7
The American Law Institute included several provisions in the Restatement (Second) of Torts that would broaden the range of uses recognized and protected under riparian rights. The Restatement (Second) of Torts would allow riparian owners to make non-riparian uses of the water withdrawn from a water body.
8 This change expresses the notion that riparian rights exist for the benefit of the owner of the rights, rather than the more traditional notion that riparian rights were a function of the relationship of the land to the water (a benefit, if you will, to the land).
59
The Restatement (Second) of Torts proposed even more far-reaching changes proposed for the rights of users who are in no way riparian, converting a non-riparian's use into a "privilege . . . subject to defeasance by the exercise of riparian rights." 60 This is the situation in dual-system states where non-riparians use the water pursuant to an appropriation
permit. The approach would introduce a radical change into the traditional law of riparian rights. Because of this theory, the Restatement (Second) of Torts rejects traditional approaches and treats grantees, 6 1 and other holders of derivative rights, 62 as fully riparian, even as against riparians who were strangers to the transaction that created the derivative right. Traditional approaches would hold that derivative rightholders have no rights at all against strangers to the original grant or that derivative rightholders are strictly derivative and could make only such use of the water as the original riparian might have made.
63
This potentially far-reaching change proposed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts thus far has been embraced only by the Supreme Court of Georgia, in the case of Pyle v. Gilbert. 4 Pyle involved, inter alia, a dispute about the effect of a conveyance of riparian rights to a non-riparian owner. The court upheld the conveyance and treated the grantee as if he were a full riparian, reaching this conclusion on the authority of the Restatement without careful consideration of the relevant policies or controlling precedents. 
C. The Watershed Rule
The classical limitation of uses to riparian lands could aliow de minimus exports from a watershed, but even such small exports are barred under the watershed rule. A watershed is an area of land off of which precipitation runs into a particular water body. Two sides of a hill or adjacent lands with slight changes in slope lie in different watersheds if the water drains in different directions. 68 Under the watershed rule, riparian land is defined not only based on contiguity to the water source, but also by being within the same watershed as the water source. 69 The watershed rule-a vestige of the natural flow theory-allows withdrawals of water from a water source only if the water is returned, directly or indirectly, to the water source of origin.
70
What constitutes a watershed can be elusive, depending upon the 
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[Vol. 24:1 PROTECT THE GREAT LAKES geography of drainage, the scale of the inquiry, and the reason for determining the limits of the watershed. 7 1 Do the Colorado and Gila Rivers in the southwest form a single watershed, or two watersheds? 72 Are the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers, which join to form the Ohio River, a single watershed? For consumptive uses of water, whether the court is dealing with one watershed or two depends on whether the dispute involves two landowners, both of whose land lies above the confluence of the two water bodies, or between two landowners, one of whose land lies below the confluence.n Although the watershed rule does not by itself guarantee maintenance of the natural flow, it does tend in that direction. 74 While the natural flow theory has been discarded nearly everywhere in favor of the reasonable use theory, 75 some scholars have championed the natural flow theory as protective of instream flows. 7 6 Some courts have embraced the watershed rule without considering whether it serves the needs of a state committed to the reasonable use rule. This is particularly true in western courts that recognize both riparian rights and appropriative rights. The watershed rule tends to diminish the land to which a riparian right applies.
The problem with the watershed rule is that water might not be most economically, socially, or even ecologically useful in its natural watershed. This reality has led several Great Lakes states to question or abandon the rule. Thus Pennsylvania's Commonwealth Court, an intermediate court, rejected the watershed rule absent proof of an actual injury from transferring water out of the watershed. 9 That would seem to resolve the question, unless the precedent were overturned by the state supreme court, but Pennsylvania's Supreme Court has not reviewed the question thus far. Yet a later panel of the Commonwealth Court endorsed the watershed rule, without proof of actual injury and without really examining the utility of the rule, in Alburger v. Philadelphia Electric Co. 80 The three judges in Alburger each gave a separate opinion on widely varying grounds, so the ultimate import of that decision remains unclear.
8 ' The Michigan Supreme Court has perhaps gone the road pioneered in Pennsylvania, declining to apply the watershed rule as an invariable rule, indicating only that "water should generally not be diverted from a watershed." 82 The court did not indicate when the general proposition should not apply.
IV. THE INTRODUCTION OF REGULATED RIPARIANISM
Riparian rights, the traditional law of all the Great Lakes states, started with a set of propositions that, if strictly applied, would have precluded or at least severely limited the possibility of exporting water from the Great Lakes watershed. Later in the twentieth century, these strictures were being undermined even without any state choosing to promote the export of water, whether within the state or to other states. Public opinion in the Great Lakes states was already moving towards a different sort of legal regime before the Ogallala aquifer proposal raised the specter of possible massive exports of water to the High Plains states.
83
In eastern states, demand for water continues to increase and precipitation patterns have become more erratic, causing recurring water shortages to become more frequent. 84 
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[Vol. 24:1 PROTECT THE GREAT LAKES commonplace, and water users' experiences have become more similar to that of water users in states to the west of Kansas City-where, because water has always been scarce or in the wrong place, the doctrine of appropriative rights (treating water more or less like private property) became entrenched. 8 ' The resulting pressure within many eastern states forced them to abandon or modify riparian rights, which had evolved on the assumption of more or less permanent surpluses. Eastern states did not, however, import appropriative rights to solve these problems. 86 Instead, a bit more than half of these states and Hawaii created a new system of law that is now called "regulated riparianism." 8 7
All states today have at least some regulatory statutes dealing with limited aspects of water quantity issues. In states still basically following traditional riparian rights, regulation protects the public interest in water yet plays little part in resolving quantity disputes between direct water users. Such disputes remain subject to traditional riparian rights. Regulated riparianism is a highly regulated system of water administration based on riparian principles that could best be described as a transition to a system of public property. 89 The transition from extremely limited regulatory intervention to more or less comprehensive regulation often is incremental rather than from a conscious design to revolutionize water rights. Disagreement persists over when to date the emergence of a true regulated riparian system in a particular state, and even today one could debate whether certain states have in fact crossed the boundary from reliance largely on unregulated common law riparian rights to a regulated riparian 
2014] 21
system. The name "regulated riparianism" offends those to whom the words "regulate" and "riparian" are polar opposites; it has the virtue of emphasizing both that the administrative permit process proceeds on essentially riparian principles, and that the new system is a regulation ofrather than a taking of-riparian rights. 90 Little has been written about regulated riparianism, and most of what has been written has seen regulated riparian statutes as minor modifications superimposed on riparian rights. 9 ' Others have seen regulated riparian statutes as poorly drafted appropriative rights statutes.
92 A few commentators (and one court) have realized that regulated riparianism is a truly different model of water law from traditional riparian rights and from appropriative rights.
93
Because the regulated riparian statutes were enacted over a span of decades and without a standard model to follow, there is considerable variation in detail between the regulated riparian statutes. Nevertheless there is a common core of principles discoverable by examining the actual regulated riparian statutes set forth in the Regulated Riparian Model Water Code approved by the American Society of Civil Engineers.
9 4 No state has a system precisely like the one described here, although several come very close. The Riparian Model Water Code and the relevant chapter of the treatise Waters and Water Rights' are the most convenient sources for detailed analysis of the regulated riparian system. I do not fully explore regulated riparianism here, but rather summarize the core features of the system.
The fundamental requirement of regulated riparian statutes, and the fundamental difference from traditional riparian rights, is that, with limited exceptions, water can be withdrawn from a water source only with a permit 90. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 17, at § § 9.01, 9.04(a).
91.
See, e.g., Scott & Coustalin, supra note 29, at 899-901 (describing statutory-i.e., regulated riparian-permit systems as hastily enacted and not fitting with other bureaucratic systems in the state or province of enactment, as well as being of little consequence and not robust enough to deal with any true crisis); see also 
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[Vol. 24:1 PROTECT THE GREAT LAKES from the state within which the withdrawal occurs. 96 The rights of water users are determined by conditions attached to the permits, not by the riparian location of the use, yet the criteria by which permit applications are judged is whether the use of the water would be "reasonable."
97 Whether a water use is "reasonable" is determined by an administrative agency before a use begins, rather than by a court when a dispute arises with another user. 98 The statutes often contain preferences for certain classes of uses,99 while temporal priority has only a strictly limited role in the permit process. 00 In most states, permits are issued only for a fixed period of time (from three to twenty years, depending on the state)."o' When a permit expires, the reasonableness of the use can be reexamined.
Regulated riparian statutes also protect the public interest in the waters of the state in new ways, creating mechanisms for long-term planning through other steps.1 02 The administering agency usually has broad discretion to plan for and deal with crises caused by extreme water shortages.o 3 The agency can incorporate permit conditions based on its plans.1 04 The agency also is often authorized to restrict uses should its plans prove inadequate to an actual shortage notwithstanding any inconsistency with a permit.os Regulated riparian permit requirements are based on the state's police power to regulate water withdrawals and use in order to protect the public health, safety, and welfare, and therefore do not require compensation as a taking of property.' 06 Fear of the political (if not the legal) repercussions of 96. MODEL CODE, supra note 99, § § 6R-1-01, 7R-1-01; Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 17, § § 9.03(a)-9.03(a)(2), 9.03(a)(5)(A), 9.05-9.05(c).
97. MODEL CODE, supra note 99, § § 2R-1-01, 2R-2-20, 6R-3-01, 6R-3-02; Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 17, § § 9.03(b)-9.03(b)(3). Some jurisdictions use the terms "beneficial," "reasonable-beneficial," or "equitable" instead of "reasonable," but define the alternative term according to the traditional riparian criterion of reasonableness.
Id. at § 9.03(b)(2).
98. MODEL CODE, supra note 99, § § 6R-2-01-6R-2-08, 6R-3-02, 6R-3-05; Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 17, § § 9.03(a)(5)(A), 9.03(b)(1)-9.03(b)(3).
99. MODEL CODE, supra note 99, § § 6R-1-02, 6R-3-04; Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 17, § § 9.03(a)(3), 9.05(c).
100. MODEL CODE, supra note 99, § § 6R-1-03, 6R-3-02; Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, supra note 17, § 9.03(b)(3). This, of course, is one of the key differences of regulated riparianism from appropriative rights. 
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interference with traditional water rights has led many state legislatures to exempt from the permit requirements some uses (usually agricultural) existing when the regulated riparian statute came into effect,o 0 introducing a significant temporal element. Some states instead guarantee existing users an initial permit subject to renewal on the same terms as any other permit, limiting the temporal preference to a single permit cycle. 0 8 Existing users who fail to apply for a permit within a short period of time are conclusively presumed to have abandoned any usage rights.1 09 Regulated riparianism does not solve some problems related to both private and public values. Investment security could be a problem if the permit duration is too short, leaving too little time to recover the cost of a project before the permit expires." 0 Additional uncertainty arises if the administering agency can modify permits to respond to new developments like unforeseen shortages."' In actual operation, however, investment insecurity seems not to have caused actual difficulty. In practice, administering agencies might be too sensitive to the fears of large institutional investors.1 2 The agencies seldom flatly refuse to renew a permit, although new and more stringent conditions are sometimes attached at the time of renewal. Administering agencies also consult with major water users in planning for water emergencies rather than acting on their own.
Regulated riparian statutes usually make no express provision for the transfer of water rights or permits between potential users."' 3 The Regulated Riparian Model Water Code, in numerous sections, charges the administering agency to encourage market transfers of water.' 14 Given the problems with water markets generally, however, a market probably will not develop for the transfer of water rights under regulated riparian permits.' '5 Theoretically, one purpose of the regulated riparian system is to [Vol. 24:1 PROTECT THE GREAT LAKES enable the administering agencies to force transfers through non-renewal of permits. 116 In practice, however, agencies free up less water through the renewal process than theory suggests, because agencies prefer to tighten conditions on existing uses rather than to deny renewals outright." 7 Nonrenewal will remain an infrequent and cumbersome device for freeing up water unless states are willing to create considerable investment insecurity.
While regulated riparianism is not a perfect system, it does appear to be best suited to the cultural, economic, legal, hydrologic, and political settings of eastern states, in particular because it builds upon the traditional riparian rights rather than attempt to abolish them. PROTECT THE GREAT LAKES
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of the public trust doctrine generally, and then it considers its application to appropriative rights, to riparian rights, and to regulated riparianism, concluding with a brief examination of its possible impact on the export of water from the Great Lakes.
A. The Public Trust Generally
Initially, the public trust doctrine barred state actions relating to public trust lands, even if authorized by legislation, unless the action furthered trust uses or had only minimal effects on such uses."' Although the US Supreme Court decided an important early case on the doctrine,1 3 4 the contours of the doctrine (including changes if necessary) remain questions of state law. 135 In the past forty years, state courts and legislatures have expanded the public trust regarding both the purposes of the trust and the properties subject to the trust. States generally extended the public trust to beaches and other lands the use of which is associated with the use of navigable waters. 
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B. Application of the Public Trust to Appropriative Rights
Appropriative rights were conceived of as private property without real attention to the public interest. Application of the public trust doctrine to appropriative rights seems to introduce concern for the public interest.
14 6
The first case to apply the public trust to appropriative rights was decided in 1976.147 That case, however, concerned applications for new appropriations, leaving unclear whether the doctrine could affect appropriations perfected before 1976.148 The possibility of such an impact arose in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,1 4 9 in which California's Supreme Court held that an appropriation permit issued to the City of Los Angeles in 1940 was subject to review and possible invalidation because of the predecessor to the State Water Resources Control Board failed to consider the public trust in the waters in question. Before 1955, the Board had no authority to consider the public trust in reviewing applications for appropriations.' 5 " The Board, moreover, had not done so after 1955.151 The court remanded National Audubon, directing the Board to reexamine the permit's consistency with the public trust. The public trust doctrine proved not to be the threat that National Audubon seemed to be. On remand, the plaintiffs found themselves before an unsympathetic judge.' 5 7 The Court of Appeals was more sympathetic. It ordered water to be released for the lake' 5 8 and subsequently denied the city an opportunity to study the needs of the fish.' 59 The public trust doctrine, however, was only a make-weight argument at the end of the two decisions. The court relied on other grounds,1 60 and it eschewed the reasonableness balancing process that the California Supreme Court in National Audubon had told us was at the heart of the public trust doctrine. 157. The attitude of the trial judge is best suggested by his refusal to order the release of sufficient water to sustain fish in the creeks feeding the lake after the California Court of Appeals ordered him to do so; instead he chose to allow the City three years to study how much water should be released. Cal. Trout, Inc. v. Superior Court (Calhfornia Trout 11) 
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enforcement of the public trust more difficult by barring private plaintiffs from suing on behalf of the general public, requiring the plaintiffs to have "suffered injury in fact" involving "lost money or property." 16 Public trust language might occasionally be useful to justify the regulation of private actors, but the regulation might also have been justified under the general police power without a claim of a proprietary interest in the state.1 67
C. Application of the Public Trust to Riparian Rights
Riparian rights still apply in three Great Lakes states (Illinois, Indiana, and Pennsylvania). The public trust has rarely been raised in riparian rights litigation. 16 8 In the few such cases, the doctrine made even less difference than under appropriative rights, appearing only as a makeweight argument because the public trust doctrine operates between private litigants just like the reasonable use theory of riparian rights.
169
After a court determines whether a water use is reasonable for the reasonable use theory, a judicial determination of whether it is consistent with the public trust is superfluous. 173. The court in National Audubon Soc 'y required the State Water Resources Control Board to take a "hard look" at the public trust interests. 658 P.2d at 727. For "remands" to a divested by an administrative agency without explicit legislative authority, moving the decision from the agency to the legislature. 1 74 Legislative conveyances of trust property into private hands must be clear and explicit; the public will not lose its beneficial interest in lands or waters through carelessness or legerdemain. 17 5 This procedural view of the public trust doctrine provides a check on unbridled greed, but it hardly creates an insuperable barrier to the development of, or export of, water from the Great Lakes. If the pressure for development or export is great enough, a legislature or agency will succumb to narrow private interests and authorize the action even after a "hard look." Yet, to do more, to hold that the court is final arbiter of how resources are to be used, is undemocratic to say the least.1 7 6 Without judicial power to determine how resources are used leaves, however, only a call to legislative responsibility.1 7 7 Whoever enforces the public trust, however, is likely to find that the requisite balancing process transforms the values expressed in the doctrine from incommensurable moral claims into rather ordinary issues regarding the monetary worth of competing uses of 315 (2000) (arguing that the public trust requires governments to undertake ecological rehabilitation).
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8 This transformation might be even more troubling than the challenge to democratic theory. Either way, the doctrine as applied to riparian rights is not likely to prove a serious barrier to the export of water from the Great Lakes watershed.
D. The Public Trust and Regulated Riparianism
Five Great Lakes states have enacted regulated riparian statutes (Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin).' 79 In regulated riparian states, the determination of whether a water use is reasonable is made by an administrative agency rather than by a court, creating a potential opening for a court to re-examine the question of reasonableness under the public trust doctrine. Until recently, courts in all but one regulated riparian state rebuffed efforts to overturn agency decisions as violations of the public trust in the few cases where the issue was raised -cases that did not involve water allocation decisions. 180 The great majority of cases in regulated riparian states involving natural resources or the environment (and not water at all) in which the public trust is raised are from Connecticut, which enacted the public trust doctrine in a statute that has become a routine citation that has never actually affected the outcome of the cases.' 8 ' Moreover, most of these cases were suits against a governmental entity, rather than against a private party. Connecticut's Supreme Court, in fact, has explicitly held that the public trust in the waters of the state does not operate independently of specific statutory standards if those standards apply to the issues before the court. In Hawaii the public trust arguably has had an effect on the administration of the state's regulated riparian law.' 83 The Hawaiian Supreme Court has been unable to explain how the public trust doctrine actually changed the outcome of the cases in which the court has invoked it. 184 The Hawaiian Supreme Court first referred the public trust doctrine as applicable to fresh waters in Hawaii in Robinson v. Ariyoshi (I).' 85 In Robinson, however, the court resorted to the public trust doctrine only in order to avoid a finding that an earlier decisionl 86 had been a taking of property.' 87 Hawaii had amended its constitution in 1978, four years before Robinson, to incorporate the substance (but not the name) of the public trust doctrine.' 88 The issues litigated at such length in Robinson and the earlier case, however, were largely rendered moot by the Hawaiian Water Code which in 1987189 made Hawaii a regulated riparian state.
The role of the public trust doctrine in the administration of the Hawaiian Water Code first arose in In re Water Use Permit Applications (I).190 After a contested hearing involving numerous parties and extending over two years, the Commission on Water Resources Management ordered the restoration of 10.4 mgd to the flows of the streams that supplied the Wai'ahole Ditch on Oahu and allocated more than 13 mgd to off-stream PROTECT THE GREAT LAKES speculative evidence without an adequate weighing of the public and private interests in setting instream flow standards.
21 0 The burden of proving consistency with the public trust fell on permit applicants.
2 1 1 She closed by noting that the Commission was not obligated to ensure any applicant's access to less expensive sources of water, so long as alternatives were available and public values would be compromised by allowing use of the less expensive waters.
12
Subsequent Hawaiian cases involved the application of the public trust to water quality standardS 2 13 and native Hawaiian rights. 2 14 Perhaps the most important addition to public trust jurisprudence from these cases is a statement that the state's duty under the public trust is as a guardian and trustee and therefore is not satisfied merely by fulfilling the duties of a good business manager.2 1 All of this leaves us with several cases in which a permit issued under a regulated riparian statute was voided for violating the public trust doctrine without the court developing a theory to differentiate the effect of the doctrine from the statutory standards already embedded in the Hawaiian Water Code. The same decisions could have been reached had the Hawaiian courts adopted the view of the Connecticut Supreme Court that regulated riparian statutes express and exhaust public trust requirements.
216
E. The Public Trust and the Great Lakes
Despite the high hopes that some hold for the public trust doctrine as the ultimate protector of the integrity of the Great Lakes, 217 the doctrine is likely to have no greater effect than under traditional riparian rights 2 18 and regulated riparianism. 219 The public trust doctrine could conceivably 
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revolutionize water allocation law under appropriative rights, but in practice its application has had little effect. 220 When courts approve the construction of sports stadiums, hotels, shopping centers, and vast parking lots in the Northeast's largest wetland as consistent with the public trust doctrine, 22 1 one can only conclude that the public trust doctrine is too weak to preserve natural hydraulic systems intact in the face of persistent pressures for development. One can argue that such decisions were wrong, but they happen too often to justify an expectation that the doctrine will preclude ecocide or ensure less destructive development of natural resources. The public trust stiffens the environmental impact assessment process, but it is not an absolute bar to development of protected natural resources.
VI. STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON THE EXPORT OF WATER FROM THE GREAT LAKES BEFORE THE GREAT LAKES WATERSHED WATER RESOURCES COMPACT
In the early 1980s, proposals to divert water from the Great Lakes to recharge the Ogallala Aquifer by spreading water on the ground in South Dakota, from which it would eventually percolate down to New Mexico and west Texas, provoked considerable debate in the law reviews.
222
Illinois, to enforce the outcome of extensive and lengthy original litigation, before the US Supreme Court had confirmed their right to divert water for use in and near Chicago but outside the Great Lakes watershed, had already prohibited the withdrawal of water from Lake Michigan without a state permit. 223 The clamor over the Ogallala proposals led legislatures in most of Minnesota was the first state to act, banning withdrawals in 1983 for out-of-state uses unless the legislature approved the withdrawal and the state's Commissioner of Natural Resources found that Minnesota would still have sufficient water to meet all foreseeable needs. 225 Indiana followed in 1984, banning withdrawals of water from Lake Michigan without the consent of the governor of each Great Lakes state. 226 At almost the same time, Illinois undertook to revise its "Level of Lake Michigan Act" by adding a requirement of a permit for any new or increased use of Lake Michigan water in excess of an average of 2 mgd in any 30-day period. Illinois's new legislation also prohibited permits for the use of water outside the boundaries of any Great Lakes state "without the approval of the other Great Lakes states and the International Joint Commission."
228
Wisconsin in 1985 adopted an elaborate scheme for managing largescale water withdrawals in the state. 229 Among other provisions, the statute banned withdrawals that would have "a significant adverse impact on the environment and ecosystem of the Great Lakes basin or the upper Mississippi river basin., 230 Wisconsin also required its Department of Natural Resources to solicit comments from the governors of the other Great Lakes states, the premiers of Ontario and Qudbec, the water management agencies of those states and provinces, and, if required by the governing treaty, the International Joint Commission, for new withdrawals from the Great Lakes "ecosystem" averaging more than 5 mgd in a thirtyday period.
231 Joe Sax was so impressed by the Wisconsin approach that he based a model act on it that influenced legislators in Minnesota and New York. 232 Michigan, however, chose to go in a different direction, enacting its "Great Lakes Preservation Act" in 1985 under which new withdrawals for transportation out of the Great Lakes basin were simply banned.
33
The several statutes differed in ways that could have affected their validity under the US Constitution. Michigan alone banned all out-of-basin withdrawals. Illinois, Indiana, and Minnesota banned out-of-state, but not out-of-basin, withdrawals. This difference reflects the geographic fact that Wisconsin was in the strongest position because it banned even intrastate and intrabasin withdrawals if they would impair the ecosystems in the state. Yet by coordinating with Ontario and Qu6bec, Wisconsin's statute arguably ran afoul of the foreign affairs power of the federal government.237 The Michigan ban initially contained a self-destruct clause, perhaps out of fear that it violated federal law. 238 Besides the risk of preemption by federal law, these statutes could be repealed or amended by any future legislature. The statutes were perhaps better than the fast eroding strictures of riparian rights or the recently enacted general regulated riparian statutes, but only marginally so. At this point, Congress intervened with the Water Resources Development Act of 1986 ("the 1986 Act") 23 9 to ratify the state legislation protecting the Lakes. The 1986 Act prohibited the export of water from the Great Lakes watershed and also prohibited federal agencies from studying the possibility PROTECT TiHE GREAT LAKES of exporting water from the Great Lakes watershed-except if the withdrawal or study received the approval of the governor of every Great Lakes state.
2 40 The constitutionality of this statute under the congressional power to regulate commerce has never been challenged. Challenges to similar exercises of congressional power under the commerce clause, such as the Endangered Species Act, have been rejected out of hand.
2 4 1 Nor has the 1986 Act been challenged politically. When Congress revisited the provisions of the 1986 Act -in 2001, it strengthened rather than weakened the position of the Great Lakes states.
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With the 1986 Act on the books, the state statutes became superfluous, and the states lost the unilateral power to repeal their prohibition of exports of water from the Great Lakes watershed; they could not authorize exports unless the governors of every other state went along. The Illinois, Indiana, and Minnesota statutes were preempted to the extent they authorized in-state but out-of-basin withdrawals. No one ever raised the question of whether the Michigan statute, which arguably barred that state's governor from consenting to an out-of-basin withdrawal, was preempted by the federal act. Michigan's governor could and did-without fear of retaliation-veto proposed withdrawals in any other state if the withdrawals were to cross the watershed boundary. 243 No governor of any other state could have any say in any proposed withdrawal within Michigan because those withdrawals would be entirely within the Great Lakes watershed. The Wisconsin prohibition of withdrawals probably survived preemption because that ban merely established the standard for consenting to withdrawals and was not an outright ban.
Although a state statute was unnecessary after the 1986 Act, Minnesota and New York enacted new statutes in 1987. These statutes are similar to Wisconsin's statute.
2 4 Minnesota added a special subsection for the Great Lakes requiring its Commissioner of Natural Resources to solicit comments from the governors of the other Great Lakes states, from the premiers of Ontario and Qu6bec, the water management agencies of those 
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states and provinces, and the International Joint Commission, for new withdrawals averaging more than 5 mgd in a thirty-day period. 245 Despite these consultation requirements, the Minnesota act reserves the final decision to the Commissioner and to the Minnesota legislature.
246 Inclusion of the premiers and water management agencies of the Canadian provinces in the consultation scheme arguably intruded on federal prerogatives, while Minnesota's failure to defer to objections from governors of another Great Lakes state is preempted by the inconsistent federal requirement.
2 47 New York in 1989 prohibited new withdrawals of water averaging more than 5 mgd during a thirty-day period until after consultations exactly like those provided for in the Minnesota statute.
24 8 The New York statute thus could run afoul of the federal statute to the same extent as the Minnesota statute. New York's statute, alone of the statutes adopted thus far, included a provision spelling out the procedures necessary to secure the governor's approval upon request from the appropriate authorities in another state. 249 Ohio, which did not have a statute before the 1986 Act, in 1988 enacted a statute prohibiting out-of-basin withdrawals of more than 100,000 gallons per day from either the "Lake Erie drainage basin" or the Ohio River drainage basin without a state permit.
2 5o The "Lake Erie drainage basin" includes Ohio's portion of the Great Lakes watershed, while the Ohio River basin includes the rest of the state. Ohio requires the Director of Natural Resources to consult the other Great Lakes states and provinces regarding the Lake Erie basin and prohibits the issuance of a permit without the approval of the other Great Lakes governors. 271 the Indians attempted to use the 1986 Act to block the bottling and export of groundwater from the Great Lakes watershed. They claimed that the aquifer supplied a spring that supported their fishing rights in Lake Michigan and certain of its tributaries, as guaranteed by a treaty signed in 1836. 272 After extended analysis of the 1986 Act's legislative history, Judge Richard Enslen dismissed the suit on the grounds that it did not create a private right of action. 273 The suit went forward in state court on claims of damage to the environment with some initial success only to have the water-law claims dismissed for lack of standing. 2 74 VII. STATUTES IMPLEMENTING THE GREAT LAKES WATERSHED WATER RESOURCES COMPACT By the year 2000, the federal government and seven of the eight Great Lakes states had erected a superstructure of laws that precluded the export of water from the Lakes. In addition to the possible vetoes by governors of the Great Lakes states (and of no other states) under the 1986 Act and the state statutes, the Army Corps of Engineers also held a veto over any withdrawal that could threaten the navigable capacity of any waterway within the watershed. 275 This complex superstructure overrode the traditional roles and rights of the states. Indiana illustrates the problem this presents. The divide between the Great Lakes watershed and the Mississippi Valley lies just south of Lake Michigan in Indiana and Illinois. Because of the legal superstructure, Indiana could not take water from Lake Michigan or any stream draining into Lake Michigan for use in communities in the northern part of the state, if it were just across that divide, without the consent of the governors of every other Great Lakes state. 276 In fact, the governor of Michigan vetoed precisely such a withdrawal for Lowell, Indiana, in 1992-a town located in Lake County about five miles from the watershed divide. 277 In contrast, the governor of Michigan did not veto a proposed withdrawal by Akron, Ohio in 1998 but only after the city agreed to bear the considerable expense of returning an equal amount of water to the source stream.
278 Thus, while the legal superstructure protected Great Lakes states from threatened large-scale withdrawals for uses far removed from the watershed, it also prevented the states from taking small steps to manage their own needs without having to enter into serious (and sometimes impossible) negotiations with other watershed states.
This legal superstructure, however, was not as strong as it appeared. Congress could, at any time, repeal the 1986 Act. That could happen if the Congressional delegations of a sufficient number of dry states were to get together to vote themselves access to the water of the Lakes, or even if the other Great Lakes states were to tire of the Michigan veto.
279 If the federal statute were repealed, any Great Lakes state could decide to divert "its" surplus water for an out-of-basin withdrawal (within or outside the state) despite efforts by other states to block it. A state opposed to another state's project could invoke original jurisdiction before the Supreme Court, but the opposing states are unlikely to obtain anything better than an equitable apportionment of the Lakes, something that the Supreme Court thus far has been unwilling to do.280 An equitable apportionment could result in vast 275. 33 U.S.C. § 1. It would take a truly massive withdrawal to threaten the navigability of the Great Lakes, although the Corps did see that as a risk in the Chicago water withdrawals from Lake Michigan. 397 (1994) . Lake County takes its name from Lake Michigan. -if the federal government does not become involved. 283 The Great Lakes states thus were not satisfied with the situation created by the 1986 Act nor with the possibility of an original jurisdiction suit. They therefore negotiated a new compact and agreement for the Great Lakes without explicitly replacing the 1986 Act. 284 Whether the new arrangements actually will improve the cooperative or collective management of the Lakes, or even whether they will actually prevent exports of water out of the basin, is not entirely clear. 285 Despite misgivings, all eight states enacted the compact and Congress gave its consent; the compact entered into effect in 2008.286 With some controversy, particularly in Ohio, 287 the states enacted legislation to implement the compact.
See
